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THE NATIONAL GUARD, PROMOTING UNITED STATES
NATIONAL SECURITY: A CASE STUDY

by

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14. ABSTRACT When the Berlin Wall crumbled, the entire nature and purpose of the security arrangement in Europe drastically changed. No longer was the goal of United States European Command (USEUCOM) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to stop East Bloc T-72 tanks from rolling through the Fulda Gap. Rather, the West had to rapidly transform its framework and focus to enhance democracy and free markets throughout Europe in an effort to maintain stability on the entire European continent. Fortunately for the United States and its transatlantic allies in NATO, these goals and values were widely shared. USEUCOM has developed a variety of peacetime programs to directly engage the Newly Independent States in Eastern Europe. Three of the most successful programs are administered by different entities but operationally create a synergistic effect that helps keep the peace and promises to provide an even more stable and prosperous future for all of Europe. The three programs are the National Guard's State Partnership Program (SPP), USEUCOM's Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) and NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP). During the last five or so years, direct involvement by members of the National Guard executing all three of these programs has resulted in significant enhancement to U.S. National Security Objectives. Citizen soldiers from throughout the nation provide dedicated and extremely competent capabilities across the entire spectrum of military operations. However, the National Guard's contribution in the current Peacetime Engagement Programs in Europe may prove to be the most significant and longest lasting contribution to peace and stability for Europe. As successful as these programs have proven to be, increased operational tempos and reduced resources have undermined USEUCOM's ability to pursue these programs without drawing on the additional forces and expertise found in the National Guard. Due to challenges of today and this greater reliance on the National Guard, it is imperative that the National Guard continually evaluate and improve its contribution in the engagement programs. In an effort to enhance the National Guard's capabilities, the purpose of this paper is to analyze how the National Guard participation in the three Engagement Programs currently in place in the new democracies of East Europe enhance U.S. National Security. To aid in this evaluation, a case study of the partnership between the State of Vermont and the nation of Macedonia will be analyzed. Specific suggestions will be made to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Vermont-Macedonian partnership, many of which will be applicable to all twenty-four participating states. Considering the recent bloodshed and continuing instability in the Kosovo region of the Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia), the importance of understanding the issues in this part of the world should assist all U.S. military members prepare for the uncertain and dangerous future in this part of the world.				
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Throughout this paper, numerous references are made to the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) as Macedonia. Internationally, the official name of the Nation is not universally agreed upon. For the purposes of this paper, the name Macedonia will be used. This name usage is a decision by the author and does not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense.

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Preface

I have written this paper for three reasons. First, I hope to enlighten readers who are not familiar with the National Guard that in addition to the exceptional job the Guard performs while executing traditional military missions, increasingly the Guard is directly involved in real world contingency operations around the globe. Second, I feel very strongly that due to the changing geopolitical situation since the collapse of communism, exacerbated by the personnel and fiscal restraints throughout the military, it imperative that our Nation exploit the inherent advantages of the Militia concept. Third, and most importantly, because of my personal involvement in Vermont's State Partnership Program with Macedonia, I have experienced firsthand the benefits of building relationships between our two countries. Peacetime Engagement Programs are a force multiplier and these direct Military to Military contacts will pay National Security dividends ideally tailored for the 21st Century.

This paper would not have been possible without help from Dr. Michael R. Hickok, Colonel Robert G. Maskiell, Major George R. Smith, III, Major Margaret G. West, and Major Judith M. Sheehan. I sincerely appreciate all of your assistance and for putting up with my endless and seemingly pedantic questions.

Abstract

When the Berlin Wall crumbled, the entire nature and purpose of the security arrangement in Europe drastically changed. No longer was the goal of United States European Command (USEUCOM) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to stop East Bloc T-72 tanks from rolling through the Fulda Gap. Rather, the West had to rapidly transform its framework and focus to enhance democracy and free markets throughout Europe in an effort to maintain stability on the entire European continent. Fortunately for the United States and its transatlantic allies in NATO, these goals and values were widely shared.

USEUCOM has developed a variety of peacetime programs to directly engage the Newly Independent States in Eastern Europe. Three of the most successful programs are administered by different entities but operationally create a synergistic effect that helps keep the peace and promises to provide an even more stable and prosperous future for all of Europe. The three programs are the National Guard's State Partnership Program (SPP), USEUCOM's Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) and NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP). During the last five or so years, direct involvement by members of the National Guard executing all three of these programs has resulted in significant enhancement to U.S. National Security Objectives.

Citizen soldiers from throughout the nation provide dedicated and extremely competent capabilities across the entire spectrum of military operations. However, the

National Guard's contribution in the current Peacetime Engagement Programs in Europe may prove to be the most significant and longest lasting contribution to peace and stability for Europe. As successful as these programs have proven to be, increased operational tempos and reduced resources have undermined USEUCOM's ability to pursue these programs without drawing on the additional forces and expertise found in the National Guard. Due to challenges of today and this greater reliance on the National Guard, it is imperative that the National Guard continually evaluate and improve its contribution in the engagement programs.

In an effort to enhance the National Guard's capabilities, the purpose of this paper is to analyze how the National Guard participation in the three Engagement Programs currently in place in the new democracies of East Europe enhance U.S. National Security. To aid in this evaluation, a case study of the partnership between the State of Vermont and the nation of Macedonia will be analyzed. Specific suggestions will be made to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Vermont-Macedonian partnership, many of which will be applicable to all twenty-four participating states. Considering the recent bloodshed and continuing instability in the Kosovo region of the Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia), the importance of understanding the issues in this part of the world should assist all U.S. military members prepare for the uncertain and dangerous future in this part of the world.

Chapter 1

Challenges for the United States European Command: Vermont-Macedonia Case Study

In this way, we bring democratic values from our states directly from the grass roots of America to the Eastern Bloc nations of the former Communist countries.”

—Lieutenant General Edward D. Baca
Chief National Guard Bureau

The National Security Strategy emphasizes the need to foster an undivided, democratic and peaceful Europe. The Balkans region poses a threat to achieving this objective. Historically the keystone to Balkans stability has been Macedonia; this is an area considered by many experts to be critical for preventing the spread of future conflict that could draw in the rest of Europe. United States European Command (USEUCOM) has developed a variety of peacetime programs to remain engaged with Newly Independent States throughout Eastern Europe, including Macedonia. Increased operational tempos and reduced resources have undermined the ability to pursue these programs without drawing on additional reserve forces and, in particular, the capabilities of the National Guard. The National Guard’s most significant contribution to the enhancement of USEUCOM security interests comes through its role in three Peacetime Engagement Programs (PEP). During the last five years, the National Guard participation has shown that linking individual states to developing democratic nations in

Europe promotes security in the region. However, there is room for improving the efficiency of this program. Many National Guard units are only partially familiar with their foreign partners' countries and culture. Moreover, these units are also unaware of how the PEPs fit within America's national security objectives. Only through a formal education program to address these shortcomings and by implementing enhancements to the overall partnership arrangement will the National Guard be able to improve the contribution of the citizen soldiers in fulfilling its role in the Total Force. Using the Vermont-Macedonian partnership as a case study, this paper will demonstrate how the PEPs, and the National Guard's State Partnership Program in particular, can be strengthened.

Defining the Vermont National Guard's Challenge

President Clinton's National Security Strategy (NSS) articulates his administration's vision for security issues affecting the United States of America. "NSS provides grand strategy and overreaching national goals and objectives."¹ The United States Military leadership uses this document as a baseline to develop the National Military Strategy (NMS). Although both the NSS and NMS documents are general enough to cover the broad objectives for the United States' security interests around the globe, they also are specific in particular areas. One overriding premise, according to these documents, is the absolute necessity for a secure and stable Europe. In addition, the NSS and NMS both cite the stability of the Balkans region as being essential to maintaining stability on the European continent.

The Balkans, which means "mountains" in Turkish, are a rough and rugged landmass situated at the crossroads between Europe, Asia, and Africa. For almost two millennia,

the Balkans have represented a line of demarcation between not only the Christian and Muslim worlds, but also between the eastern and western Christian worlds. Stability in the Balkans has often proven elusive. At times the instability and conflict emanating from the land lying between the Danube River and the Dardanelles has spilled over to the rest of Europe. C. L. Sulzberger characterized it as “a gay peninsula filled with sprightly people who ate peppered foods, drank strong liquors, wore flamboyant clothes, loved and murdered easily and had a splendid talent for starting wars.”² The status of Macedonia has had a critical effect on the stability of the Balkans since the late 19th Century.

Due to its key location on the Balkan peninsula, many call Macedonia the “heart of the Balkans.” During the last six or so years, this nation has been in a difficult and challenging transition from a region within the former communist Republic of Yugoslavia to the newly independent, democratic Republic of Macedonia. Continued stability is critical for a successful transition to take hold. The success or failure of this country’s survival is likely to shape greater regional interests of the United States. The National Defense University’s *Strategic Assessment 1997* argues that, “Macedonia is geo-politically important because, if a conflict was to begin there, an expanded Balkan war would be difficult to prevent and contain.”³ Considering that the United States still considers the viability of the state to be in question, all peacetime engagement programs in Macedonia take on added importance.⁴ Therefore, it is essential for Macedonia’s U.S. partner in the State Partnership Program, the State of Vermont, to continually evaluate and improve its relationship with Macedonia. In order to build an engagement program to meet its partner’s specific needs, the first step is for the National Guard in Vermont to

understand Macedonia's three most threatening challenges to its security: 1) Albanian ethnic strife, 2) hostile neighbors, and 3) an anemic economy.

Albanian Ethnic Strife

As with the rest of the Balkans, the most incendiary problem in Macedonia results from the mixed ethnicity of the nation. The ethnic mix in Macedonia is so notorious it inspired the French word macedoine meaning "mixed salad."⁵ While "true Macedonians" trace their roots to Slavs arriving in the Balkans around the 7th Century, after over a millennia a "true Macedonian" is hard to find. This small chunk of land resembles a rough and rocky coastline that has been beaten by endless waves of immigrants from the Eastern and Western worlds. Greeks, Turks, Bulgars, Vlachs, Serbs, Albanians, Gypsies and more live within the borders. Listed below is the current ethnic breakout for Macedonia:⁶

Table 1. Macedonian Ethnic Breakdown

Macedonian	67%
Albanian	23% (Albanians claim 35%)
Turk	4%
Serb	1%
Other	5%

Though all groups of minorities have expressed some dissatisfaction with the government, the most urgent minority problem is with the large and in most ways disenfranchised Albanian population. The Albanian discontent surrounds the desire for: (1) allotment of better government housing in western Macedonia, (2) Albanian language education in post secondary schools, (3) increased allocation of public sector jobs, and (4) increased media access. Two of the biggest impediments slowing down

improvements in these four areas is the result of direct opposition from ethnic Macedonians and austere times in the economy.

The threat to the sovereignty of the Macedonian nation from radical Albanians on both sides of the border has revived a more vocal and opposing pro-Macedonian faction. “An increase in Albanian nationalism, coupled with the revival of Islam, has helped create an opposing nationalism among Macedonia’s Slavic majority, some of whom call for a ‘Greater Macedonia’...”⁷ Macedonian nationalist movements has quite a storied history starting in the late 19th Century. Both the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) and the Supreme Macedonian Committee fought against the Ottoman Empire in an effort to secure Macedonian autonomy. This “Macedonia for Macedonians” rally cry that dates back to 1893 has been picked up by the present day pro-nationalist VMRO party.⁸ While progress is slowly being made reconciling the differences between the Albanian nationalists and the Macedonian nationalists within the borders, other problems lie immediately outside of its borders.

Hostile Neighbors

Macedonia is surrounded on all four sides by hostile neighbors. Albania, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece all have different reasons for their enmity. Starting with the name of the country to its very existence, there is little about this small nation that doesn’t provoke some type of dispute with any one of its neighbors.

On Macedonia’s western border lies Albania. Since most Macedonian Albanians live in the western part of the country adjacent to Albanian border, the previously mentioned Albanian issues are in actuality tran-border in nature. To the north is the Serbian region of Kosovo. Kosovo is greater than 90% ethnic Albanian. This area

continues to be a source of internal strife for Serbia. In March of 1998 alone, some eighty Albanians have been killed by Serb forces in Kosovo. In response to the heavy handed Serb actions, the Kosovo Liberation Army has been slowly escalating a guerrilla war against Serbia. “In the rebel movement’s first contact with the Western press, (Alban) said the insurrection is led by ethnic Albanians from Kosovo and Macedonia who fought as volunteers against the Serbs in Bosnia.”⁹ The combination of ethnic strife from within Macedonian borders and the “Greater Albanian” threat from Albanians in Albania and Kosovo poses the most serious risk to the stability of Macedonia, and potentially all of Europe.

On Macedonia’s northern border, the Serbian region of Kosovo is not the only problem. Serbia represents the remnants of Yugoslavia and claims ethnic and religious kinship to Macedonia. Pruitt J. Vesilind explained that, “to the north militant Serbs consider Macedonians misguided country cousins who belong in a Greater Serbia.”¹⁰ To stabilize the tension between these former Yugoslav republics, the United Nations (UN) stationed over a thousand peacekeeping soldiers on the Macedonian-Serbian-Albanian border in 1993. This U.N. Preventative Deployment force is comprised of U.S. Active Army, National Guard, Reserve, and a Nordic Battalion of Finnish, Swedish, Danish and Norwegian troops. On 5 December 1997, the UN Security Council unanimously voted to extend the peacekeeping mission until 31 August 1998. Due to the recent bloodshed and continued instability in Kosovo, the UN is now re-evaluating all aspects of the operation. In Macedonia, Kosovo violence coupled with the stalled negotiations over undefined border areas between Serbia and Macedonia make any departure dates for UN forces

unpopular. Peace never comes easy in the Balkans, and Macedonia realizes that Serbia's actions towards other former republics has been anything but neighborly.

Likewise Bulgaria to the east poses as a significant current and historic rival. Since 976 Bulgarians have claimed this “Upper” Macedonia land as their own on at least five separate occasions. “The Bulgarian government, while recognizing the Macedonian *state*, does not recognize the Macedonian *nation*, that is, the people. It regards the Macedonians as ethnically Bulgarian.”¹¹ The Bulgarians further claim that the Macedonian language is merely a different dialect of Bulgarian. Taking into account the economic problems, rising nationalism and an unstable government in Bulgaria, territorial expansion toward Macedonia could provide a convenient distraction from their anemic domestic situation.

The last and probably most antagonized neighbor, Greece, constitutes Macedonia’s southern border. Greece’s own northern providence “Greek Macedonia” (historically known as Lower Macedonia) borders the new Macedonian nation. The controversy lies partly with the Greeks claiming to have ownership of the historical prestige of the ancient Macedonian Empire. The Greeks opposed the original Republic of Macedonia’s flag, the mere use of the name and most of all the “usurpation” of the proud “Greek legacy” of Alexander the Great. In 1994, Greece escalated the controversy by closing its borders to Macedonia for eighteen months. In December of 1997, two years after the borders had been re-opened, Greece has instituted a painfully labyrinthine and essentially unworkable visa policy. Many are accusing Greece of another de facto border closing. Until the name issue can be resolved, Macedonia can continue to expect frigid relations from Greece.

Even though Macedonia shares unique ethnic, religious and cultural ties with its neighbors, acrimonious relations prevail. Considering that over the last two thousand years, Macedonia has on numerous occasions been the desire of these same neighbors, internal instability could provide a convenient excuse for irredentist actions by these neighbors in the name of “regional stability.” Maintaining peace inside and outside its borders is essential if Macedonia is going to be able to tackle another major problem threatening the security of the nation, an anemic economy.

Anemic Economy Development

The last significant factor detracting from the stability of Macedonia is its lack of economic development. Soon after the Republic’s independence in 1991, there were high hopes for a quick move toward capitalism. “Accepting a market and liberal economy in Macedonia was not such a major shock as it was in the East. Just the opposite, our citizens readily awaited such change.”¹² Much progress was initially made on three fronts; (1) more than 80% of the arable land was in private hands, (2) over 50,000 private small businesses were created, and (3) privatization of large state owned business began immediately.¹³ It is estimated that by the end of 1997, “over 90% of all the resources and all economic capacities of the country is in private hands.”¹⁴ Unfortunately, the rapid reforms by the new Macedonian government and its leaders could not anticipate external factors that would have the effect of pouring cold water on a campfire.

A series of embargoes against either Macedonia directly or against its neighbors due to the war between Serbia and Croatia had a devastating effect on interstate trade. Bulgaria originally offered a means to get Macedonian goods to the world market, since

the Greek and Serb borders were closed. However, Macedonia and Bulgaria could not agree on the language of the agreement. “Skopje was insisting that the document be made out and printed ‘in Macedonian and Bulgarian.’ Sofia refused to do this on the grounds that ‘there is no Macedonian language: it is a Bulgarian dialect.’¹⁵ US Department of State estimates that the Macedonian GDP was reduced by “an estimated 50%” due to the border closings.¹⁶ Vicissitudes due to privatization, embargoes, non-competitiveness and other factors contributed to a 30-40% unemployment rate in 1996. When citizens are hungry and unemployed, the lofty ideals of democracy and capitalism loses some of its luster. Civil unrest and demand for change poses a direct threat to its national security. Unfortunately for the USEUCOM CINC, Macedonia represents only one of the problematic areas under his jurisdiction. How these three Macedonian security issues relate to U.S. national security interests will be evaluated in the following section.

Notes

¹ *National Military Strategy of The United States of America 1997* (n.p.), p. 6.

² Robert D. Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts* (New York: St. Martin Press, 1993), p. ivx.

³ *1997 Strategic Assessment, Flashpoints and Force Structure* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1996), p. 153.

⁴ *1997 Strategic Assessment, Flashpoints and Force Structure*, p. 153.

⁵ Pritt J. Vesilind, “Macedonia, Caught in the Middle.” *National Geographic Magazine*, March 1996: p. 124.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

⁷ “Rising Ghosts,” *The Economist*, 26 July 1997: 344, Issue 8027, 44.

⁸ Mike O’Connor, “Nationalists Stoke Macedonia’s Anxiety,” *New York Times*, 30 March 1997.

⁹ Chris Hedges, “Notes From the Underground on Another Balkan Rift,” *New York Times*, 4 May 1997: p. 8.

¹⁰ Vesilind, p. 126.

¹¹ Dornberg, John, *Central and Eastern Europe* (Phoenix, AZ: Oryx Press, 1995), p 20.

¹² “Macedonian Privatization,” *New York Times*, 24 September 1996: p. 12.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p.12.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.12.

¹⁵ Dornberg, p. 20.

Notes

¹⁶ *US State Department, Macedonia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996* (n.p.), p. 1.

Chapter 2

How the National Guard Enhances USEUCOM Theatre Strategy

In order to ensure readiness and face the threats of tomorrow and beyond, our Total Force must work together.

—William S. Cohen
Secretary of Defense

After the demise of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the entire nature and purpose of the security arrangement in Europe drastically changed. The disappearance of the monolithic military threat demanded that USEUCOM and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) rapidly transform its framework and focus to enhance democracy and free markets throughout Europe in an effort to maintain stability on the entire European continent. Fortunately these goals and values were universally shared between the United States and its transatlantic allies in NATO. General George A. Joulwan, former Commander-in-Chief USEUCOM, 1997 vision statement demonstrates this new focus for the West:

A community of free, stable, and prosperous nations acting together while respecting the dignity and rights of the individual and adhering to the principles of national sovereignty and international law.¹

This vision statement represents a lofty goal considering that USEUCOM encompasses a very large Area of Responsibility (AOR) which includes eighty-three countries each with their own unique visions for the future. USEUCOM's theatre

strategy which directly supports the NSS and NMS is called *Engagement and Preparedness*. The CINC has articulated that he desires to engage nations in his AOR in peacetime to “shape the environment, prevent conflict and limit the impact if conflict occurs.”² In the lands of the former Yugoslavia, shaping an environment that has been scarred by over a century worth of ethnic hatred and rabid nationalism requires a sincere and focused U.S. effort. Only by remaining engaged in the region and by interacting with individuals from all nations will relationships be built that can enhance peace and stability in the future. Hence, USEUCOM Theatre Objectives that directly contribute to the appropriate NSS and NMS objectives in the Balkan region are as follows:

- Maintain, support and contribute to the integrity and adaptation of NATO
- Promote stability, democratization, military professionalism, and closer relationships with NATO in the nations of Central Europe and the Newly Independent States
- Support U.S. efforts to ensure self-sustaining progress from the Dayton Process; develop military institutions in former Yugoslavia adapted to democratic civilian control³

To accomplish these objectives, in light of the realities of shrinking defense budgets and increased operations tempo (OPTEMPO), greater reliance on the National Guard is essential. General Joulwan summed up the net effect of the citizen soldier’s contributions while testifying before Congress on 27 February, 1997; “The reserve components provided indispensable capabilities and OPTEMPO relief and are crucial to operations in the former Yugoslavia and many other USEUCOM activities.”⁴ With the recent decision by the President of the United States to maintain American troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina indefinitely, the reliance on the National Guard will continue to be critical as it plays a larger part in peacetime engagement.

As General Joulwan's testimony before Congress indicates, utilization of citizen soldiers is nothing new in operations throughout the Balkans. In fact, in almost every major USEUCOM, NATO or United Nations operation, including Operation Deny Flight, Deliberate Force, Task Force Able Sentry, Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard, the National Guard and the Reserves have proved invaluable to the operation. The Reserve Components have provided a wide breadth of capabilities to Air and Army operations throughout the Balkans; fighters, tankers, tactical airlift, strategic airlift, rotor-wing aviation, civil affairs, combat communications, infantry units, Military Police, public affairs, military history detachments, and artillery fire support teams to name a few. These activities have supported Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-enforcement activities throughout the entire former Yugoslavia. As important as these operations are to the current stability of the region, less known Peacetime Engagement Programs (PEP) may be the National Guard's most important contribution to long term security in the region.

Three Engagement Programs that help to accomplish these goals are today helping to maintain stability and promote U.S. national security. These three programs are administered and promoted by different entities but operationally create a synergistic effect that helps keep the peace and promise to provide an even more stable and prosperous future for all of Europe. The three programs are the National Guard's State Partnership Program (SPP), USEUCOM's Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) and NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP). The National Guard is directly involved in executing all three of these programs.

The SPP, JCTP and PfP all involve direct military to military contact that builds trust between military members who often were enemies less than a decade ago. These engagement events “serve to demonstrate our commitment; improve interoperability; reassure allies, friends and coalition partners; promote transparency; convey democratic ideals; deter aggression; and help relieve sources of instability before they can become military crises.”⁵ The great Chinese General Sun Tzu said “know thy enemy.” Due to the complexities of the geo-political situation in the 21st Century, knowing thy ally is even more essential if long-term, meaningful relationships are to be cultivated between military leaders in the international community.

Notes

¹ *United States European Command Theatre Strategy*, 1997 (n.p.), p. 1; On-line. Internet, 27 February, 1997, available from <http://www.eucom.mil>.

² Ibid., p. 2.

³ Ibid., p. 11.

⁴ Ibid., p. 4.

⁵ *National Military Strategy*, p.7.

Chapter 3

National Guard Participation in Peace Engagement Programs

We few, we happy few, we band of brothers; for he today that sheds his blood with me shall be my brother.

—Shakespeare
Henry V, Act IV, Scene 3

Partnership for Peace




Figure 1. Partnership for Peace Nations

The first and most visible Peace Engagement Program is the Partnership for Peace (PfP). At the conclusion of the Cold War, many Central and Eastern European nations

expressed desire to join NATO. In 1991, NATO created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to provide a forum where former adversaries from across Europe and Eurasia could interact and hopefully develop closer relationships with the West. The PfP program was instituted within the framework of the NACC to facilitate these goals and to provide a stepping stone for possible future NATO membership. NATO's ultimate goal for establishing this program was to promote stability and encourage peaceful, democratic governments throughout the lands of former communist regimes.

PfP is “multilateral” meaning that member countries attend meetings, conferences and exercises with other participating countries. In 1997, PfP membership includes twenty-six participating nations while NACC boasts a membership of forty different nations from Europe and Eurasia. When General Michael E. Ryan was commander of U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE), he characterized the attributes of PfP participation: “the goal is to have the partner nations either familiar with or common in ‘our systems, our procedures, our tactics and techniques,’ so that they could participate in a Bosnia-like operation at need.”¹ While this interaction between East Bloc and NATO countries is clearly important, the framework also facilitates interaction and cooperation between neighbors, many who have contentious relationships.

“To join PfP, participants sign the Partnership for Peace Framework Document in which they promise ‘to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, to respect existing borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means.’”² While PfP membership has not proven to be a “silver bullet” in this regard, it clearly provides a structured framework facilitating interactions between participating nations resulting in increased stability across the entire region.

The funding for this program comes from NATO and PfP member nations. Other sources of funding originates from various CINCs that have a vested interest in a particular exercise or activity. For example, the State of Vermont recently sent nine Guardsmen to MEDCEUR 97-2. This was a NATO humanitarian medical exercise with multi-lateral PfP participation. Because Vermont's State Partnership Program (SPP) partner, Macedonia, was involved, EUCOM, TRANSCOM and ACOM all provided funding to send the Vermont Guardsmen to Europe. Vermont's experience in these initial contacts demonstrate how new partnerships are likely to evolve.

Joint Contact Team Program



Note: plans due to SACEUR by 15 Apr 98 for the addition of Georgia, Moldova & Ukraine to the JCTP.

Figure 2. Joint Contact Team Nations

USEUCOM's Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) is the next step in engagement. The objective is to bring American ideals and democratic values to fourteen (soon to be seventeen) countries from the former East Bloc and Newly Independent States. The

specific goal of the JCTP is to “provide essential infrastructure-building information while presenting the U.S. armed forces as a role model of a capable military under effective civilian control.”³ The JCTP is planned, funded and controlled by USEUCOM. However, the personnel involved in every level of JCTP come from mix of Active, Guard and Reserve professionals.

The first and most critical component of the JCTP is the U.S. Military Liaison Team (MLT). MLTs are comprised of three to five person joint teams of U.S. personnel that are stationed in host nations for six to twelve months. “The MLT members live and work in the host nation, apart from the U.S. Embassy, interfacing primarily with the Minister of Defense and the General Staff.”⁴ MLT are headed by a MLT-Chief. Chiefs are either senior Officers from the Active component or members of the National Guard or Reserves from the nation’s partner U.S. state. MLT often represent the United States’ first military contact with many of these nascent nations. It is through this initial contact that bonds of trust and mutual respect can begin to build between the U.S. and host nation.

The MLTs coordinate and execute events that are associated with JCTP and SPP events in USEUCOM AOR. Additionally, under very limited basis the MLT also can assist PfP events that do not entail training or exercises. Combined PfP, JCTP and SPP events from FY93-FY97 total over 4,488. In addition, there are 811 different JCTP events scheduled for FY98. Even though PfP, JCTP and SPP are separate programs with separate proponents and funding, the resulting effects of all three programs often means a sum that is greater than the individual parts. Only with continued involvement and expertise from the National Guard and Reserves will these valuable outreach programs be

possible. This in turn implies a need for the National Guard and Reserves to continue to evaluate their training and processes to improve their ability to accomplish these new kinds of missions. The SPP provides the best opportunity for enhancing the National Guard's role in this regard.

State Partnership Program




Figure 3. State Partnership Program Nations

The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) is a bi-lateral engagement program that directly links U.S. states with developing democracies around the world in support of U.S. National Security interests. The program began in December of 1992 in three Baltic States and since has expanded to include twenty-four U.S. states involved in

the USEUCOM area of responsibility. “The National Guard’s goal is to demonstrate, through the example of the citizen-soldiers, the role of the military in a democratic society.”⁵ The objectives of the SPP are:

- Build democratic institutions
- Foster free market economies
- Project American values
- Promote interoperability between military and civilians
- Replace prejudice with informal opinions ⁶

The links between the partners begins with the State Governor and his or her National Guard and the Ministry of Defense and members of the armed forces of the participating nation. Though it is through the direct grassroots military to military contact that most of the long-term relationships are built that promise the best results for the future.

The MLTs mentioned in the JCTP section play an integral role in executing the SPP events. The mechanism that facilitates further personal contact is through members of the National Guard executing various missions as part of Travel Contact Teams (TCT). TCTs involve National Guard citizen-soldiers travelling to the host nation to give briefings on “civil-military topics such as air search and rescue, medical evacuation, personnel, budgeting, administration, military law, professional military education, disaster response planning, and family programs.”⁷ While the formal TCT missions are important, it is often the informal contact between American citizen-soldiers and members of the armed forces of the host nations that help build trust and mutual respect between the partners. It is therefore critical that National Guard members be prepared to operate in these foreign cultures. In addition to the TCTs, host nations send military members on Familiarization Visits (FAMS) to the U.S. The exchange of information is

important on FAMS, but like the TCT missions, the contact between the personnel from both sides of the Atlantic is the enabler for the construction of long standing institutional affiliations. Only by both partners getting aquatinted with each others military and civilian way of life will the National Guard be able to make a “compelling case for the ideals of democracy, professionalism, and deference to civilian authority.”⁸

The TCT and FAMS events are carefully planned and scrutinized to accomplish specific objectives. Each MLT Chief has written a Country Working Plan (CWP) that are “country specific.” These CWPs show the linkage between the NSS, NMS, USEUMOM Theater Strategy, Ambassador’s goals and host nation’s goals. The intent is to ensure that all events or missions directly contribute to the enhancement of the aforementioned goals, objectives and strategies. USEUCOM will accomplish an assessment of all MLT’s using their CWP as a guide in FY98. Considering the need to get more National Security bang for reduced available bucks, the SPP fits the bill.

Even though the National Guard is the proponent of the SPP, funding for the program is provided from many different sources depending on the type of event being executed. National Guard Operations and Maintenance funds, Overseas Deployment Training, Traditional CINC Activities, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs to include Innovative Readiness Training, JCTP, Temporary Tour of Active Duty, Mobility Training Teams from Security Assistance, PfP Warsaw Initiative Funds only, Cooperative Threat Reduction, International Military Education Training, Humanitarian Assistance/Peacekeeping, U.S. International Aid, Joint Chief Staff Exercises Program, and participating nations all contribute funds depending on the event being sponsored.

Typical events under the SPP auspices include training sessions, joint exercises, JCTP events and even some non-military events are allowed.

In the post-cold war world, the SPP has proven to be a successful National Guard outreach program that emphasizes to participating nations the absolute necessity for military subordination to civilian authority in a democratic society. In accomplishing this primary SPP goal, the overarching NSS objective of engagement as a method of shaping the environment to enhance U.S. security is being accomplished. What can't be qualified are the dividends this program will pay in the future because of the relationships that have been established between personnel from twenty-four U.S. states and partner nations. The SPP is a true force multiplier and may provide the most significant contribution to the long-term security interests for the United States in Europe of any other citizen-soldier activity.

Notes

¹ "Airpower in the European Theatre," *Air Force Magazine*, October 1997, p. 28.

² "Partnership For Peace," *Microsoft Encarta 97 Encyclopedia*, 1997.

³ *Joint Contact Team Program*, (n.p.), p. 1.; On-line. Internet, 1 December, 1997, available from <http://www.eucom.mil>.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁵ Lt. Col. C.A. Reimer, National Guard Bureau Directorate of International Affairs, Information Paper-*The National Guard State Partnership Program*, p. 1.

⁶ Colonel Robert B. James, Jr.-Director National Guard Bureau Directorate of International Affairs, *Presentation to USEUCOM*, Microsoft Power Point Presentation slides, p. 3.

⁷ Reimer, p. 1.

⁸ Reimer, p. 1.

Chapter 4

Improvements to the Vermont-Macedonian State Partnership Program

What did you expect, you were the first American pilot we had ever met!

—Captain First Class Dragi Gjosevski
Macedonian Squadron Commander

Macedonia and the State of Vermont began its partnership in the SPP in March of 1995. From inception through December of 1997, the two partners have executed over fifty SPP events and numerous additional PfP activities. Similar to other SPP participants, the fifty plus missions have entailed TCT and FAM events across a wide spectrum of activities. These military to military exchanges and interactions have greatly improved the understanding between the U.S. military and the Defense Forces of Macedonia.

One such event typifies the progress that can be accomplished through a single TCT. In April of 1996, a joint three-member TCT was sent to Macedonia to brief Macedonian civilian and military leaders on U.S. search and rescue techniques while responding to natural disasters. On the fifth and final day of the mission, the Air Base Commander at Skopje requested the visiting American team answer questions from the combined fixed and rotor wing squadrons of the Macedonian Air Forces before two member of the TCT were to fly in the Macedonian ZLIN 242L aircraft. The first four to five minutes of the

question and answer session was a complete stand off. The Air Base Commander repeatedly directed his pilots to ask the Americans questions, but the room was filled with silence. For the Macedonian pilots, the majority of whom were previously members of the Yugoslavian Air Force, this was their first exposure to their former adversaries from the west. One of the U.S. visitors broke the ice by talking about the Vermont Air National Guard's F-16 Squadron. Eventually the first Macedonian asked a simple question about the F-16, and for the next forty-five minutes the Macedonians asked every imaginable question about the F-16, the Americans' military background, education, families, and culture. A day that began with a great deal of personal and professional caution ended with genuine respect and the seeds for future friendships. These initial bonds would only improve over the coming months.

Six months after this first contact, one of the pilots who took a Vermonter for a ZLIN flight in Macedonia visited the Vermont Air Guard while on a FAM. After renewing a six-month old friendship, one of the TCT members reciprocated the ZLIN flight by taking the Macedonian pilot on a F-16 orientation flight around New England. After the flight, the entire Macedonian FAM team spent a lively evening with members of the Vermont Fighter Squadron in a hunting lodge in rural Vermont. The conversation, food and fellowship between the two military groups took a long step forward from the first contact between the groups during the tense and even hostile question and answer session six months previous. Only by direct contact like these two instances will trust develop so as to promote both the objectives of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the USEUCOM CINC.

The SPP is clearly accomplishing the goals as articulated by the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the USEUCOM CINC. However, there are a few shortcomings that need to be addressed if the SPP is to continue to improve providing the National Command Authority with its best possible contribution to enhancing national security interests. The following suggestions are specifically directed toward the Vermont National Guard and improving its partnership with Macedonia in light of current security issues affecting Macedonia and the objectives of the SPP. As a review, the three significant challenges to Macedonian security include Albanian ethnic strife, hostile neighbors and an anemic economy. Also, the objectives of the SPP are to build democratic institutions, foster free market economies, project American values, promote interoperability between military and civilians, and replace prejudice with informal opinion to build democratic institutions. While these suggestions are specific to the Vermont-Macedonia case study, in many cases all twenty-four participating SPP states may be able to utilize some of these suggestions to improve their relationship and effectiveness with their SPP partner.

1. A structured day of briefings need to be developed and given to all future TCT members and FAM hosts. The briefing should include but not be limited to:
 - a. An overview of the SPP and how it contributes to fulfillment of the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy and the USEUCOM Theatre Strategy. Also, this section will identify how the SPP, JCTP and PfP engagement programs operate and complement each other.
 - b. The historical background of Macedonia and the rest of the Balkan peninsula. The controversial history of this nation and its neighbors is critical to understanding the cultural, ethnic and religious acrimony that is ever present inside and outside of Macedonia's borders. Unless some of these issues are known, interactions between both sides of the partnership will never proceed beyond the superficial level and may in fact lead to misunderstandings.
 - c. The serious internal and external challenges that are currently facing the nation. For example, Albanian ethnic strife, hostile neighbors, the condition of the economy, a brief description of the political system and its progress toward

democracy, military capabilities and any other information the MLT considers germane.

- d. A review of past, current and future U.S. security issues in the region. This section should include what other U.S., NATO and UN troops are doing in and around the Balkans and in neighboring states. By understanding the basic tenets of the Dayton Peace Accords, the current state of affairs of the SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the status of Task Force Able Sentry, the TCT and FAM hosts will be better prepared to interact in an informed and effective manner with their Macedonian counterparts.
- 2. When FAMs send Macedonians to Vermont, a short rudimentary briefing should be given to the visitors to aid such SPP goals as promoting democracy, civilian control of the military, and the citizen soldier concept. This briefing should include:
 - a. The basic structure of the U.S. federal and state government.
 - b. The basic structure of the National Guard.
 - c. An explanation of how the National Guard provides the civilian leadership a cost effective, professional military force that can respond to natural disasters at home or protect the nation abroad.
- 3. Build upon the TCT approach of direct military to military contact.
 - a. Establish a Macedonian MLT in Vermont to act as liaison for FAM events and generally improve understanding between the two nations.
 - b. Promote the exchange of individuals or small teams of individuals on a long-term basis. These exchanges can either be a shadow arrangements, augmentees or possibly full fledged members of an organization. In any case, by increased exposure provided by long term exchanges, the ideals and attributes of the U.S. system can make a more lasting effect.
- 4. Small Unit should perform fifteen-day Annual Training in Macedonia.
 - a. Civil Engineers from the Vermont National Guard (VTNG) in the last five years have traveled to Africa, Central America and Israel performing humanitarian construction projects. The Civil Engineers could deploy to Macedonia to work on humanitarian housing for Albanians in western Macedonia. This would promote good will from the American and Macedonian military toward the Albanians.
 - b. The VTNG Mountain Battalion normally trains with the 4th Corps Alpini in the mountains of Italy about four times per year. Some of these training events could take place in the mountains of Macedonia in joint operations with the Macedonian Special Units that are "Mountain Qualified."
 - c. Macedonian Special Units likewise could 1) send select soldiers through the Mountain Warfare School at Camp Ethan Allen Training Site, 2) send squad or platoon size elements to observe and possibly participate with corresponding type units of the VTNG during annual training exercises.
 - d. The Armor or Artillery Battalions in Vermont would be well served by sending units, maybe even company size, to train in the Krivolak Training Area in Macedonia. Moreover, the Macedonians could send units to Camp Ethan Allen.
- 5. Like units between the two countries should be "married" together to facilitate suggestion number 4. The Zlin Fighter Squadron in Macedonia could be a sister unit with the F-16 Fighter Squadron in Vermont. Likewise, the rotor wing units, civil

engineers, mountain, infantry, artillery could all become sister units with each other that would assist in insuring continuity of contacts for years to into the future.

6. The civilian government of the State of Vermont needs to be brought on line as a full partner in the SPP. As citizen-soldiers, the National Guard is uniquely suited in promoting the benefits of open lines of communication between military and civilian leadership. From the Governor on down the line, more state agencies need to be included if the goal of promoting democracy and advocating civilian control of the military is to be fully conveyed to the Macedonians.
 - a. Demonstrate on FAMs how the National Guard works with civilian agencies like the State and local Police, Border Patrol, Customs, and State and Federal Emergency Management Agencies.
 - b. Expose FAMs to the recent efforts of lobbying the State Legislature for issues directly affecting National Guard members. Seeing how National Guard members interact with the civil leadership directly supports the goals of the SPP.
 - c. Encourage sister-city relationships between towns and cities in Vermont and towns and cities in Macedonia.
7. Take advantage of the scores of National Guard personnel that are members and leaders of civic organizations throughout Vermont to encourage an outreach to like organizations in Macedonia. National Guard men and women are members of organizations including Rotary International, Kiwanis Club, Jaycees, Knights of Columbus, and Lions Club to name a few.
8. Encourage business organizations including local Chambers of Commerce and Development Corporations to investigate potential business opportunities between the partners. This could be done in conjunction with or in addition to the State Government increasing its participation.

As previously mentioned, this list of suggestions are generally specific for the Vermont-Macedonia case study, but many are clearly applicable to any state and their partner nation. The intent of this list is to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Vermont-Macedonian relationship, and hopefully provide a framework for which other partnerships can utilize to improve their programs as well.

Chapter 5

Conclusions

During the Cold War, our objective was easier to state-deter an attack by the Soviet forces, and prevent a nuclear holocaust. Today's problems are more complex and our Total Force must be seamless.

—William S. Cohen
Secretary of Defense

Considering the increase in military obligations around the globe and the decrease in personnel and financial resources available to the U.S. armed forces, it is essential for the military to operate in the most effective and efficient manner possible. Promoting regional stability through engagement with foreign military forces has proven to be an effective use of our military forces. Engagement can take many different shapes including training, combined exercises, security assistance and forward deployment, all of which deters aggression and coercion, reducing conflicts and threats and allows American forces to serve as role models for military forces in emerging democracies.¹ The opportunity for the U.S. military to work with countries that until five or so years ago were considered potential adversaries, greatly enhances the prospect of becoming true allies in the future. The National Guard's participation in SPP, JCTP and PfP have proven to be three successful engagement programs that fulfills that need.

The National Guard's State Partnership Program is clearly enhancing National Security interest in Macedonia, the Balkan Peninsula and throughout the entire

USEUCOM Area of Responsibility. As the military continues to metamorphous back to its militia roots, it is imperative for every member of the National Guard to understand the critical nature of its contributions to the defense of the nation while continually striving to improve its processes. By enacting some of the improvements suggested in the previous chapter, this excellent program can improve its ability in promoting U.S. security interests.

While General Ronald Fogleman was Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force he said, “our National Guard and Reserve forces are truly a force multiplier that we have made a full partner in our day-to-day operations as well as contingency operations.”² The National Guard’s participation in Peacetime Engagement Programs in Europe represents the type of “force multiplier” missions the National Guard is uniquely capable of performing. The contributions of the National Guard represents the very best traditions of the citizen soldier and will pay National Security dividends ideally tailored for the 21st Century.

Notes

¹ *A National Security Strategy For A New Century*, May 1997 (n.p.), p. 8.

² “How the Total Force Works,” *National Guard Magazine*, January 1997. p. 20.

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